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Promise and donation in Louisiana and comparative law 
 
Martin A. Hogg * 
 
(1) Introduction 
 
The interaction between the concepts of promise and donation is an under-explored aspect 
of private law, and it is intended in this paper to attempt to remedy the relative neglect of 
the relationship between these two important pillars of the law. In particular, an answer will 
be sought to the fundamental question of whether donation can, and perhaps ought to be, 
characterised in promissory terms, or whether some other characterisation is more apposite. 
The answer, it will be suggested, is that, while promise and donation can both be 
characterised as unilateral juridical acts, it is possible to separate out promises to donate 
(obligations as to a future performance) and acts of donation (present acts of transfer), even 
if it is quite common in some legal systems to bring both within the heading of donation 
more widely conceived. It will also be suggested that, while many systems conceive of 
donation in contractual terms, this is unnecessary: donation is essentially a unilateral act, 
requiring only the act of will of the donor to facilitate the transaction. Contractual 
conceptions have developed in large part, it would appear, as a result of concerns that 
donations not be unconsidered and potentially illiberal and that they not be foisted upon 
unwilling recipients. However, protecting against unconsidered giving need not necessitate 
dressing up a unilateral act in bilateral clothing, and giving a donee a right of rejection is 
just as suited to preventing unwanted donations as is requiring the donee to accept.   
 There is, as the following discussion will show, quite a degree of jurisdictional 
divergence in the conception of, and requirements for, donations. The legal systems chosen 
for comparative study in this paper are a mix of civil, Common law and mixed systems: (1) 
Louisiana; (2),(3) two further mixed legal systems, Scotland and South Africa; (4) France; (5) 
Germany; and (6) England (with some reference to US Common law also). The 
interrelationship of promise and donation in these systems is undertaken largely with inter 
vivos donations in mind. 
 A useful place to begin the comparative analysis is with an exploration of the 
meaning of the concepts of promise and donation. 
  
(a) The concept of a promise 
A promise is a statement by which one person commits to some future beneficial 
performance, or the beneficial withholding of a performance, in favour of another person.1 
The simplest, and some might argue the purest,2 form of promise is the unilateral promise, 
that is to say a promise which is intended by the promissor to be immediately binding upon 
him as soon as the promise is uttered (or committed to writing and delivered) and which 
therefore requires the act of will of the promissor alone to be constituted as an obligation. 
There is however nothing inimical to the idea of promise in a promise being conditional, in 
                                                 
* The School of Law, University of Edinburgh, Scotland. 
 
1 There is a vast literature on the conceptual issues relating to promise. For citation of much of it, see M. Hogg, 
Promises and Contract Law: Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2011), ch. 1. For a 
comparative critique of promissory solutions to some common transactions, see M. Hogg, ‘Promise: the 
neglected obligation in European private law’ (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 461-79. 
2 The Scottish jurist James Dalrymple (Viscount Stair) described a unilateral promise as ‘that which is pure and 
simple’ (The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, I,x,4) 
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the sense that it may be intended only to bind the promissor when a condition is fulfilled by 
the promisee.3 Such a conditional promise is apt to describe the reciprocal promises which 
contracting parties can be said to make to each other in a mutual contract, or indeed the 
promise made by one party alone in a gratuitous contract (such promise being met only 
with an acceptance but no reciprocal promise), thus allowing contract to be described in 
promissory terms.4   
 In at least one of the systems studied (Scotland), there is a tradition of utilising the 
term promise in a legal context only in the narrower sense, for the reason that the unilateral 
promise is conceived of as a separate and valid species of voluntary obligation from the 
contract.5 However, in the other systems studied one encounters use of the term promise 
either to mean either a unilateral promise (which will only exceptionally constitute a valid 
obligation at law in those systems) or, as the context may suggest, a conditional promise of 
the type which is a component of a contract. 
 
(b) The concept of donation 
Donation is a gratuitous transfer of ownership of a thing by one person to another.6 In its 
simplest form, donation may be constituted by an immediate act of transfer, by which A 
donates something to B simply by handing over the thing or some symbolic token of the 
thing (title deeds to land for instance) to B.7 In this simplest form of donation, it seems to 
make little sense to describe the act of donation in promissory terms: if A simply transfers 
ownership in something to B, he is not promising to do anything, as a promise relates to a 
future performance rather than a present act. A is donating the thing, rather than promising 
to donate it. If then there can be said to be any promissory aspect to a present act of 
donation, it can only lie in some supposed implied and secondary promises attendant upon 
the act of transfer.8  
 In a more extended case of donation, however, the juridical act of transfer may be 
preceded by a preliminary juridical act, such preliminary act being a commitment of the 
intending donor to undertake the act of donation at some specified future point. Such a 
commitment is most likely to be in contractual form, though it may conceivably, in systems 
where this is possible, take the form of a unilateral promise. This more extended case of 
donation thus includes two stages as components of the transaction: at point in time 1 (T1), 
the intending donor undertakes to effect the gratuitous transfer of a thing to another at 
some later point in time (T2) - this constitutes the first juridical act (J1); at T2, the donor 
effects the transfer to the donee, thereby conveying ownership of the thing transferred - this 
constitutes the second juridical act (J2). Both juridical acts could theoretically be 
characterised as unilateral in nature, as both might conceivably (if the legal system in 
question were to so allow) be undertaken by the donor alone, without the involvement of 
the donee. In all legal systems, however, J1 might alternatively be accomplished by way of a 
                                                 
3 Such a condition is suspensive of the obligatory effect of the promise. 
4 Though some would dispute that promise is apt to describe the nature of contract, such debate is too 
involved for the present discussion. For the detail of the debate see Hogg, Promises and Contract Law, ch. 2. 
5 See further M. Hogg, Obligations (Edinburgh: Avizandum Publishing, 2nd ed., 2006), ch. 2. 
6 So defined, the concept excludes the gratuitous conferral of benefits other than ownership upon another, 
though on some jurisdictional definitions of donation such benefits are considered as falling within the rules 
on donation. 
7 As discussed below, this simple conception of donation is that which is embodied in the French Code civil.  
8 For instance, it may be that A is deemed, in the act of donation, to have impliedly warranted certain things 
about the thing transferred and to have impliedly promised, if such warranty turns out to be false, to make 
good the breach of warranty. Such fictional, implied promises may best not be described as promises at all 
however, and may be better seen as obligations resulting from default rules of law governing the transaction. 
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contract, a bilateral juridical act, and in many systems J2 is also conceived of as a bilateral 
juridical act, either because the act of transfer is also described as a contract or, without 
being described in contractual terms, the (non-contractual) act of transfer nonetheless 
requires to be accepted before it is considered to have been validly undertaken. In these 
extended cases of donation, as in the simpler cases of donation, there is no need to see the 
act of transfer (J2) as a species of promise, even if its occurrence is in fulfilment of a prior 
unilateral or contractual promise constituting J1. The act of transfer is a present act by which 
ownership is transferred, one which is thus inapt for characterisation in promissory terms.  
 In the extended cases of donation, either the act of transfer alone,9 or the act of 
transfer together with the preceding obligation requiring it, may be described as 
constituting the ‘donation’. Where the preceding obligation is conceived of as forming part 
of the overall donative transaction, it may be styled as the ‘contract of donation’ to 
distinguish it from the later act of transfer; then again, in some systems where the act of 
transfer is itself conceived of as a contract, the term ‘contract of donation’ is used to 
encompass J2. Such jurisdictional inconsistencies in characterisation of donation are apt to 
confuse.  
  
(c) Definitional problems 
Further confusion is created for a comparative analysis of donation and promise through the 
ascription of different meanings to fundamental characteristics of juridical acts such as 
unilateral/bilateral and gratuitous/onerous. The problem is even greater when, within a 
single jurisdiction, there is disagreement among jurists as to the meaning of such 
characteristics. That latter type of infra-jurisdictional confusion can be minimised (though 
not always eliminated) in systems in which fundamental characteristics of such acts are 
given a definition in applicable legislation, as is the case with the Louisiana Civil Code, for 
instance.  
 As to the distinction between unilateral and bilateral (or multilateral), the 
fundamental disagreement lies in whether unilateral means (as it is suggested it ought to) 
an act which can be constituted by one party alone, or whether alternatively (or 
additionally) it relates to the number of parties coming under duties as a result of the 
constitution of the act in question. If the former meaning is exclusively maintained, then a 
promise constituted as an obligation by one party alone is evidently unilateral, whereas a 
contract must necessarily be bilateral, requiring the conduct of two (or more) parties to 
constitute it. On this meaning, donation might be unilateral if the involvement of the donee 
is not required to effect the donative transfer, whereas if a system requires the donee’s co-
operation the act would be bilateral in nature. If the latter meaning is maintained, then a 
promise legally constituted by the act of one party alone would again seem to be unilateral, 
given that no-counter performance could be compelled at the point of the obligation 
coming into being. On this second meaning, donation would be likely to be considered 
unilateral, unless a reciprocal duty of gratitude were considered to be imposed upon a 
donee, as is the case in some systems. Whichever of the two meanings of unilateral is 
signified in law is evidently a matter for particular jurisdictions. In Louisiana, for instance, 
which lacks a requirement of mutual consideration, the Civil Code provides for ‘unilateral 
contracts’, by which is meant a contract where one party’s obligation lacks a reciprocal 
obligation;10 in English law, which has a requirement of mutual consideration, a ‘unilateral 
contract’ in this sense should not be able to exist, though in fact certain unusual types of 
                                                 
9 This is the French position: see discussion below at section (2) in the main text. 
10 CC Art. 1907: ‘A contract is unilateral when the party who accepts the obligation of the other does not 
assume a reciprocal obligation’. 
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arrangement which receive legal recognition but which appear to lack reciprocal  
consideration are nonetheless described as ‘unilateral contracts’;11 in Scotland, the idea of 
unilateral denotes the first of the two senses described earlier, that is the number of parties 
required to constitute an obligation, so a contract can never be unilateral given that all 
contracts require the cooperation of two parties at least in order to be constituted. To 
complicate matters even further, some systems use the idea of unilaterality in both of the 
senses described: in South Africa, for instance, contract is always bilateral in the sense that it 
requires to be constituted by the conduct of two parties, but a particular contract may 
additionally be unilateral in the sense that it imposes only duties on one of the parties. The 
confusion inherent in such dual usage of terminology is undesirable and might be avoided 
by using an alternative term to unilateral to describe obligations imposing duties on only 
one of the parties.  
 Such an alternative way of describing an obligation imposing duties on only one party 
could be found through use of the term ‘gratuitous’. Thus, a ‘gratuitous contract’ could be 
characterised as one imposing duties on only one party, the opposite being an onerous 
contract (one imposing duties on both parties). However, matters are complicated by 
debates as to whether the idea of a gratuitous transaction is one under which A cannot 
compel any counter-performance from B, or whether it relates to the factual question of 
whether A has received any counter-performance, whether or not it might have compelled 
such performance from B.12 Gratuitousness is generally judged from an objective perspective 
- what matters is that the party undertaking the act receive no reciprocal benefit - though in 
some systems the idea of the subjective intention of the party undertaking the act also forms 
a part of the definition.13 Thus, in Louisiana, a gratuitous contract is defined by reference 
both to the liberal motivation of the first party (it must be one which is undertaken ‘for the 
benefit of the latter’) as well as its effect in fact (it is undertaken ‘without [the first party] 
receiving anything in return’).14  
  Lest it be thought that legal Codes resolve all such definitional problems, it might be 
noted that even in Louisiana, as a result of the definitions adopted in the Civil Code, there 
remains a debate as to whether a gratuitous contract and a unilateral contract are really one 
and the same thing, merely described from a different point of view,15 or whether, while all 
gratuitous contracts are unilateral, not all unilateral contracts are gratuitous.16  
 The plethora of definitional permutations described above make comparative 
discussion of the nature of promise and donation a complicated affair. In an ideal 
comparative world, all Western legal systems would agree terms for such fundamental 
descriptors of the nature of an obligation; without such agreement, comparative analysis of 
donation is rendered more difficult. Such an ideal world is some way off, however. 
  
                                                 
11 In English law, some instances of what are called unilateral contracts are bilateral juridical acts, characterised 
by both offer and acceptance (such as offers of reward, the performance of the stipulated conduct required for 
the reward being considered the acceptance), while others appear to be unilateral juridical acts, not requiring 
acceptance to be constituted, such as the unilateral contract which was the subject of Harvela Investments Ltd. 
v. Royal Trust Co. of Canada [1986] AC 207. 
12 This question is an unresolved one in Scots Law: see further Hogg, Obligations, paras. 1.16 - 1.17; 2.06 - 2.11. 
13 German law, as will be seen below, has a quite distinctive approach to testing the gratuitous nature of 
donation, focussing on the agreement of the parties that the transaction be gratuitous: see discussion in the 
main text at section (3). 
14 CC Art. 1910: ‘A contract is gratuitous when one party obligates himself to another for the benefit of the 
latter, without receiving anything in return’.  
15 On such a view, the focus in the idea of a gratuitous contract is the motivation for the undertaking, whereas 
the focus in the idea of a unilateral contract is the effect produced. 
16 On this view, gratuitous contracts are merely a subset of unilateral ones. 
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(d) Donation in Roman law 
The roots of modern legal conceptions of donation lie in Roman law, albeit that a full 
development of the potential which donation held for effecting the gratuitous conferral of 
benefits upon others required further development by the scholastics and canonists. 
 In classical Roman law, donation had no special form of its own: it was a causa, or 
reason for a legal act, rather than a type of legal act itself. Rather than a single form of 
donation, a number of different types of juridical act could be used to effect a transfer which 
was donative in character (in classical terms, one which was intended to confer a gratuitous 
benefit upon another party, not necessarily ownership of a thing). Thus, a present and 
immediate gratuitous transfer of property requiring a formal conveyance could be 
accomplished using the form of mancipatio; a promise of a future donation could be 
achieved through use of a stipulatio (‘Do you promise to give me your cow gratuitously?’ ‘I 
promise’). The general point to note is that, while a mere informal agreement to donate 
could not (at least in classical Roman law) be enforced, any one of a number of valid forms 
could be used to effect donation: what linked all acts classifiable as donation was the animus 
donandi (intention to donate), and, so long as such donative intention might be achieved 
using a specific legal form, that form could be utilised to give the intention legal effect. 
Originally, an intended donee who was the mere recipient of an informal promise to donate 
(or, for instance, the promisee under an improperly constituted stipulatio) acquired no right 
to the thing donated unless and until delivery of the thing was effected, though the 
necessity for delivery could be avoided in later Roman law through registration of an 
instrument of donation.17 
 Despite the freedom to donate suggested by the multiplicity of forms which a 
donation might conceivably take, this very freedom was in part responsible for suspicions 
concerning donation in Roman society. What appeared to be one thing, might in reality be 
something else. An apparent gratuitous promise might conceivably be a bribe; a seemingly 
unobjectionable gift by husband to wife might be made in favour of an undesirable spouse, 
one perhaps of lower social standing than the donor and of whom the donor’s family 
disapproved, thus conceivably transferring wealth from one family to another; a transaction 
might dilute an heir’s inheritance by transferring property to other beneficiaries. In 
consequence, classical Roman law came to restrict the use of donation by, for instance, 
prohibiting, at the commencement of the Imperial era, donations between spouses.18 In 
time, however, Roman law became more disposed towards donation, especially under the 
reign of the Emperor Constantine, whose Christian faith informed a favourability on his part 
towards charitable donations.19 
 One innovation of Constantinian law was to see donation as a bilateral act, 
immediately executed and instantly transferring ownership from donor to donee:20 donation 
on this view had begun to move beyond a mere causa towards something of the form of a 
specific legal transaction, one conceived of as comprising a one stage juridical act rather 
than the alternative J1 and J2 model discussed earlier. Donative transfers had to be 
undertaken in written form, the document narrating the name of the donor, the title, and 
the description of the property,21 and the thing to be donated had to be delivered to the 
                                                 
17 As to registration of instruments of donation, see discussion in the main text below. 
18 See R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Oxford University 
Press, 1996), pp. 482-490. This rule lingered long into the modern law in some places: in South Africa it was 
not abolished until 1984 (see the Matrimonial Property Act, Act 88 of 1984, s.22). See, for the rule against 
marital donations, D. 24.1.64, 65, 67. 
19 Zimmermann, ibid, p. 491. 
20 Zimmermann, ibid, p. 492.  
21 C. Th. 8.12.1; C. 8.53.25. 
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donee before witnesses. The instrument of donation had to be registered.22 These 
requirements of form and constitution were designed to facilitate proof of donations as well 
as to act as a form of safeguard against unconsidered giving. One can trace legal restrictions 
on donation in some of the modern systems discussed below to such Constantinian 
regulation of donation, residual suspicion against acts of donation often manifesting itself in 
the modern law either in a presumption against an act having a donative character or at 
least in restrictive rules for the constitution or registration of donations.23 
 By the time of Justinian there had been a conceptual separation of the act supporting 
the donation and the act of transfer: donation had become a two-stage transaction. Informal 
agreements by which a party undertook to make a donation became enforceable,24 Justinian 
confirming such undertakings as a valid type of contractual relationship. This development 
may be seen in the mention in a Justinianic text from the Codex of ‘contracts of sale, 
exchange, or donation’.25 The registration requirement was relaxed for small value donations 
(those of 500 solidi or less, which did not require writing either26) and for some other 
categories of donation.27 A further noteworthy development was that the pollicitatio (a type 
of unilateral promise in favour of a municipality) came to be treated as a type of donation,28 
this providing a further historic basis (in addition to the form of stipulatio mentioned 
earlier) for later conceptions  of donation as a form of promise. The motive of donors came 
to be emphasised as crucial in determining whether donation had occurred: had the donor 
acted from motives of liberality and generosity?29 While a laudable concept, this sowed the 
seed of uncertainty and subjectivity in the law, as it was not always clear why donors acted, 
some perhaps acting out of mixed motives. For this reason, some modern codifications 
(though not the French) have moved away from enshrining the motive for a donation at the 
heart of the concept. 
 The history of the Roman law of donation is one of shifting attitudes towards the 
desirability of donation, of changing rules regarding delivery and registration, as well as of 
differing analyses of donation as either a one or two stage transaction and as founded upon 
a ‘contract of donation’ or not. The various modern legal systems considered below did not 
uniformly transpose a single position adopted by Roman law at any one point in its history; 
rather, a number of different positions adopted along the historical arc of the development 
of Roman law are reflected in the rules of the modern law of the various systems studied, 
though the specific present day position adopted by each is the result not just of the direct 
absorption of Roman law but of a later legal development (in which Roman legal influence 
played a role of varying importance) which will not be considered in any depth in this 
paper.30 As will be seen however, one Roman rule that most (though not all) later systems 
                                                 
22 C. Th. 8.12.1. Eventually, registration was taken to preclude the need for witnesses (C. 8.53.31), hence the 
omission of any such requirement in the interpolated text of C. 8.53.25. But for donations not in writing and 
not registered, witnesses were still required in later Roman law:  . 
23 For a fuller discussion of the historical reasons for such suspicion of donation, see R. Hyland, Gifts: A study in 
comparative law (Oxford University Press, 2009), passim. 
24 Inst. II,7,2.  
25 C. 4.21.16. 
26 C. 8.53.29. 
27 As to such exceptions, see C. 8.53.34. 
28 D. 39.5.19 pr. 
29 D. 39.5.1 pr. A remunerative gift, for past services rendered, was however also considered a donation: D. 
15.3.10.7. 
30 It has, for instance, been convincingly shown how, after the rediscovery of Aristotle in medieval Europe, the 
Aristotelian idea of liberality – giving the right amounts, to the right people – was used to justify legal 
restrictions such as the formalities often imposed upon gratuitous transactions like donation: see James 
Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine (Oxford University Press, 1991), passim. 
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continued to maintain was the need for some formality in the constitution of, or registration 
of, donations.31 
 
(e) Basic elements of donation in modern law 
In the modern law, comparative analysis indicates that the elements typically required for 
donation are that: 
 
(i) the transfer must be gratuitous (a requirement of variable, and somewhat imprecise, 
content), or at least (in some systems) predominantly gratuitous; 
(ii) the donor must intend to undertake a donation (that is, must possess animus 
donandi), or there must be an agreement that the transfer is a donation;32 
(iii) the nature of what is transferred or created must (in most systems) be a 
patrimonial right rather than, for instance, the performance of services or some 
contractual right;33 and 
(iv)  the donation must (in most systems) be in a particular form or be accompanied by 
notarial attestation.  
 
As will be seen, as in later Roman law, most modern systems view donation as a contract, 
and employ the language of promise (if at all) only in the sense of a ‘contractual promise’ to 
donate, Scotland being the exception where a unilateral promise is a separate species of 
obligation thus making it possible unilaterally to promise to make a donation. While in 
most systems, there is an understanding that any preceding obligation to donate (J1) and the 
succeeding act of transfer (J2) can be distinguished, the consequences of this division is 
sometimes under-explored in national jurisprudence, and in a number of systems both 
juridical acts are considered component parts of an overall transaction referred to in the 
round as ‘donation’.  
 
(1) The mixed legal systems: Louisiana, Scotland and South Africa34 
 
(a) Louisiana. In the jurisprudence of Louisiana, a donation has been described as a 
‘gratuitous or predominantly gratuitous juridical act whereby one person (the donor) 
disposes of a thing (the donatum) in favor of another (the donee)’.35 More particularly, 
though the Civil Code does not provide a general definition of a donation, it does provide a 
definition of donation inter vivos, that being:  
 
                                                 
31 Though some exceptions came to be commonly accepted, for instance donations to charitable causes and 
gifts in consideration of marriage (these were both discussed by, among others, the Spanish Scholastic Molina: 
see his work De iustitia et jure, disp. 279, nos. 2 and 7), as well as so-called ‘remunerative donations’ (Molina, 
disp. 279, no. 6). The concept of the ‘remunerative donation’ is retained in the Louisiana Civil Code, as the 
discussion in the main text below indicates. Louisiana also maintains special rules relating to donations for 
charitable purposes (see La RS 9:2271) and by third parties in contemplation of an intended marriage (CC Art. 
1734). 
32 The latter approach is that of German Law: see discussion below at section (3) of the main text. 
33 South Africa is an exception here, where the gratuitous cession (assignment) of rights is considered a form of 
donation. 
34 On the nature of mixed legal systems, see K. Reid, ‘The Idea of Mixed Legal Systems’ (2003) 78 Tulane Law 
Review 5. 
35 J. Randall Trahan, Louisiana Civil Code: Donations and Successions, A Coursebook (3rd ed, 2004), p. 5. 
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a contract by which a person, called the donor, gratuitously divests himself, at 
present and irrevocably, of the thing36 given in favor of another, called the donee, 
who accepts it.37 
 
Given the requirement that the donor divest himself ‘at present’ of the thing, it would seem 
that strictly speaking any preceding undertaking to effect an inter vivos donation at some 
future point (rather than presently) would not qualify as a component part of the inter vivos 
donation, but would be a separate preceding transaction, albeit one concerning an intended 
inter vivos donation. However, as in other systems, an act of donation in Louisiana can occur 
without reference to any prior duty to effect the donation.  
 It was only in a change made to the Code effective as of 1st January 2009 that 
donations inter vivos were explicitly characterised as contracts. Prior to that, the relevant 
article used the word ‘act’ rather than ‘contract’ to describe such donations, although in any 
event the received view had been that donations were by nature contractual.38 The 
contractual characterisation of inter vivos donation would seem to apply not just to the 
present act of transfer which is the subject of the above-quoted provision, but, given the lack 
of any codal provision providing for enforcement of unilateral promises, to any preceding 
undertaking to effect a donation in the future.  The Louisiana characterisation of inter vivos 
donation as contractual derives from French law, as later discussion of the French position 
will indicate. 
 As to the gratuitous, or predominantly gratuitous, nature of donation, whilst, as 
noted earlier, gratuitous contracts are defined in the Civil Code both by reference to the 
benevolent intent of the donor and the objective absence of a reciprocal benefit, because 
donation need only be ‘predominantly gratuitous’ the codal provisions on donation provide 
a specified arithmetic rule for testing such a predominance of gratuitousness: a transaction 
cannot fall within the donative provisions of the Code if it is burdened with an obligation 
imposed on the donee that results in a material advantage to the donor of two-thirds or 
more of the value of the thing donated.39 The result is two subclasses of transaction, each 
falling within the donative provisions of the Code: what may be called ‘pure’ donations 
(those which are entirely gratuitous in nature), and what are styled ‘onerous donations’ 
(those which impose a burden on the donee which does not result in a material advantage 
to the donor of more than two-thirds of the value of what is donated).40 The two-thirds of 
                                                 
36 The thing disposed under a contract of donation must be either ownership or some other real right (there is 
no concept of the donation of services in Louisiana). 
37 CC Art. 1468. The requirement that the donor must divest himself ‘at present’ does not exclude donations 
subject to suspensive conditions from being valid donations, because, although the condition may not be 
fulfilled for some time, the donor immediately divests himself of the power to recall the obligation (see further  
10 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, §8.1). By an ‘irrevocable’ act is meant one in terms of which the will of the 
donor to effect the donation is irrevocably given (thus the donor may not retain the power to revoke the 
donation at will); however, the donative transfer may be revoked for failure of a specified cause, for 
ingratitude, for non-fulfilment of a suspensive condition, or upon the occurrence of a resolutive condition (see 
CC Art. 1556). 
38 See, for instance, the comment in 10 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1995), § 9.1, that a ‘donation inter vivos is a 
contract between the parties... acceptance by the donee of the object offered is required.’ The contractual 
nature of donation in Louisiana Law is discussed at some length by Randall Trahan, Theoretical and Practical 
Commentary on Donations (2000), commentary on CC Art 1468 (inter vivos donations). 
39 CC Art. 1526 (prior to 2009, the stipulated proportion was only one half.)  
40 Confusingly, transactions which fall foul of this two-thirds value rule are still called ‘onerous donations’ even 
though they fall, in consequence, outside the scope of the donation regime of the Code. There would seem to 
be much sense in dispensing with the use of the term donation for such transactions altogether: see further on 
this point, Randall Trahan, Theoretical and Practical Commentary on Donations (2000), section B (‘Lack of 
proper systematization’), who suggests that an approach similar to that of the Roman law’s category of mixed 
9 
value rule also applies in respect of donations given as payment for services rendered by the 
donee, these constituting a third subclass of donations styled ‘remunerative donations’.41 
The result of the ‘predominantly gratuitous’ rule is therefore that a transfer can involve a 
reasonably considerable reciprocal benefit to the donor and still be considered donative 
under Louisiana law. As to other features of donation apart from their gratuitous nature, 
under the Code they may be conditional42 or revocable,43 but may not relate to future 
property.44 
 The general rule is that an inter vivos donation must be ‘made by authentic act under 
the penalty of absolute nullity, unless otherwise expressly permitted by law’,45 such 
authentic act being ‘a writing executed before a notary public or other officer authorized to 
perform that function, in the presence of two witnesses, and signed by each party who 
executed it, by each witness, and by each notary public before whom it was executed’.46 
Such an act will usually state the identity of the donor, the donee, and the thing donated, in 
it.47 Strictly, the act of donation could be signed by the donor alone, and then notarised.48 
However, because a valid donation requires that the donee must actively accept the 
donation before the donation takes effect,49 such acceptance is also usually stated in the act 
of donation by means of a notarised signature of the donee. However, the donee might 
conceivably accept in writing at some later point.50 If immovable property is donated, not 
only must a valid act of donation be undertaken,51 but the executed act must be recorded in 
the records of the Parish where the property is located.52 In the case of corporeal moveable 
property, an authentic act of donation is not required: delivery of the thing by donor to 
donee is sufficient to effect the donation, such delivery both substituting for the notarised 
document53 as well as constituting acceptance of the donation.54 
 The contractual conception of inter vivos donations in Louisiana means that any 
unilateral promissory description of the nature of such donations would be both 
inappropriate and inaccurate. Even donations mortis causa, which are conceived of in 
Louisiana as unilateral juridical acts,55 have not been described in the Louisiana 
                                                                                                                                                                  
sale with donation (negotium mixtum cum donatione) would make for a more appropriate description for 
transactions which are not wholly gratuitous. 
41 CC Art. 1527. 
42 CC Art. 1528. The condition, however, may not be one the fulfilment of which depends solely on the will of 
the donor: Art. 1530. 
43 CC Art. 1532. If no stipulation as to revocability is made, then revocation for ingratitude is possible, though 
this is strictly curtailed to cases where the donee has attempted to take the life of the donor, or if he has been 
guilty of cruel treatment, crimes, or grievous injuries in respect of the donor: see Art. 1557. 
44 CC Art. 1529. 
45 CC Art. 1541. An exception from the requirement of an act of donation is made in respect of the donation of 
incorporeal moveables evidenced by a certificate, document, instrument, or other writing, and transferable by 
endorsement or delivery (Art. 1550), where compliance with any formalities for the transfer of such property is 
required but not the notarised act normally required for donations. 
46 CC Art. 1833(1). 
47 CC Art. 1542. 
48 The codal provisions concerning donations by third parties in contemplation of a marriage require the 
instrument of donation to be signed by the donor and by both of the prospective spouses, though no express 
acceptance of the donation is required (CC Art. 1735). 
49 CC Art. 1551. 
50 CC Art. 1544. 
51 CC Art. 1550. 
52 La. RS 35:199. 
53 CC Art. 1543. 
54 CC Art. 1544. 
55 CC Art. 1469.  
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jurisprudence in promissory terms, though such a description might, in an ideal world, be 
apposite for them.  
 Louisiana has some quite extensive provisions relating to the interaction of donation 
and succession rights,56 including requirements that inter vivos donations may have to be 
‘collated’ in order to ensure a proper apportionment of an estate among the heirs, but 
discussion of those provisions is outside the scope of this paper, particularly as they do not 
give rise to any promissory issues that are not already covered by the above discussion of 
Louisiana law. 
 
(b) Scotland 
Scotland is perhaps the jurisdiction where it is easiest to undertake validly to donate 
something. That is so by virtue of a number of features of the law: (1) no specific formalities 
relate to a juridical act of transfer constituting a donation (J2) in Scotland, so that donation 
can be constituted orally, if desired, and proved by witness testimony alone – significantly, 
there is no requirement of writing or notarisation; (2) such a juridical act of transfer (J2) is 
viewed as a unilateral act, not requiring (as in Louisiana) the consent of the donee; and (3) 
any prior obligation to effect a future donation (J1) need not be in the form of a contract, but 
may also be undertaken unilaterally, in the form of a unilateral promise (some such 
promises requiring to be in subscribed written form, but others requiring no more than oral 
constitution).57    
 Despite the relative ease with which donation can be achieved in Scotland, there is 
still, as in most other systems, a residual suspicion of donations. This suspicion was certainly 
established by the time Viscount Stair wrote his seminal work The Institutions of the Laws of 
Scotland. Stair, writing in the late seventeenth century, noted that it is ‘a rule in law, donatio 
non praesumitur; and therefore, whatsoever is done, if it can receive any other construction 
than donation, it is constructed accordingly.’58 A further interesting feature of Stair’s 
treatment of donation is that it is found in his discussion of ‘obediential’ (or involuntary) 
obligations, rather than as one might have expected of voluntary obligations. This was due 
to the fact that Stair saw donation as giving rise to an involuntary duty of gratitude on the 
part of the donee; if such gratitude was not forthcoming, the donation was invalidated and 
the donee obliged to return it.59 In the late eighteenth century, donation began to be linked 
with promise (though any promise to donate (J1) was conceived of separately from the act of 
transfer effecting the donation (J2)),60 however modern treatments of the law usually 
confine promise to works on contract and donation to works on property, there being little 
by way of unitary treatment of the promissory and transfer aspects of donation.61  
 It is clear that in the modern law both any unilateral promise of donation, as well as 
the donative act of transfer are conceived of as unilateral juridical acts, requiring only the 
                                                 
56 See the title of the Civil Code on Successions (Arts. 871 ff), especially ch. 2 (on collation, Arts. 1227 ff). 
57 Business promises require no formality of constitution, and, while it may seem less likely that donations 
would occur in a business context, one can think of examples of such promises. Thus, a whisky manufacturer 
might unilaterally promise to the organisers of a charity raffle to donate a bottle of whisky to the raffle, or a 
company might, without any prompting, promise to another company in its group that it will donate to the 
latter certain equipment which it no longer requires. These undertakings, most naturally viewed as unilateral 
promises, would be enforced in Scots law. As to the formalities required for obligations, including unilateral 
promises, see the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s.1. 
58 Inst. I,viii,2. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Erskine, Institute, III,iii,90. 
61 For a forthcoming discussion which does link the two aspects of donation, see M. Hogg and H. L. MacQueen, 
‘Donation in Scots Law’, in M. Schmidt-Kessel (ed.), Donation in European Law (expected 2011). 
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active participation of the donor to effect them. They are also both gratuitous acts, in that 
the donor can compel nothing in exchange for the promise of donation or the transfer of the 
property in question (gratitude by the donee is no longer compelled). Each act, however, 
may be made conditionally (sub conditione), in which case the obligation or transfer is not 
binding until fulfilment of the condition, or for a specific purpose (sub modo), as for 
instance in the case of a gift of a wedding present.  
 What is absent in Scotland is any treatment of donation in contractual terms. While 
there is nothing to prevent a contract of donation being drawn up, given the existence of a 
separate obligation of unilateral promise and the conception of that species of promise as a 
gratuitous obligation, it is perhaps unsurprising that prior undertakings to make a donation 
have most often been conceived of as unilateral promises and not contracts, given that they 
often predominantly reflect the will of one party. Neither has the act of transfer effecting a 
donation been conceived of in contractual terms: there is no tradition in Scots law of seeing 
the disposition of property, whether gratuitous or for consideration, in contractual terms, 
even if there is a preceding contract binding the transferor to make the disposition. A 
contractual conception of the transfer of property has been unnecessary given that the 
recipient of a transfer is not conceived of as having positively to accept the transfer; instead, 
a right of rejection exists (unless the recipient has previously bound himself to receive the 
property).62 However, unlike unilateral promises, which may be made in favour of parties 
not yet in existence, a donative act of transfer cannot be made in favour of such a party: a 
transfer of property requires an extant transferee, even if the consent of such transferee is 
not required to effect the transfer.63 
 As to a unilateral promise to donate, the ordinary requirements for the formation of 
such a promise are applicable, principally that (1) there must be a disclosed intention on the 
part of the promissor to be bound at law to the stipulated promise, and (2) the promise must 
be in writing, if not undertaken on the course of business.64 In respect of the act of transfer, 
the donor must clearly and unequivocally possess an intention to effect the act of donation 
(animus donandi).65 Until 1920, there was a strong presumption against donation between 
spouses, but this particular presumption was abolished by statute.66 Indeed, since 1920 other 
statutory rules have almost created a presumption in favour of the marital donation,67 a 
notable contrast to classical Roman law. In addition to animus donandi, delivery of the 
property must take place, either actual physical delivery or, in the case of land or 
incorporeal property, some written document in terms of which ownership is transferred. 
No notarisation of the transfer, or the preceding promise, is required, though if the transfer 
relates to land the relevant act of transfer (the ‘disposition’) must be subscribed by the 
                                                 
62 See Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, vol. 8, para. 611 
63 Ibid, para. 614. 
64 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s.1(2). 
65 The requirement of a clear and unequivocal animus donandi has been stated in a number of cases: British 
Linen Co v. Martin (1849) 11 D 1004 at 1008, per Lord Fullerton and at 1011 per Lord Jeffrey; Heron v. M’Geoch 
(1851) 14 D 25 at 30 per Lord Fullerton; Sharp v. Paton (1883) 10 R 1000 at 1006, per Lord President Inglis; 
Callander v. Callander’s Executor 1972 SC (HL) 70. The requirement has often been justified as necessary to 
overcome the presumption against donation.  
66 Married Women’s Property (Scotland) Act 1920, s.6. 
67 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, s.26. This rule created a rebuttable presumption that money derived from 
any allowance made by either spouse for joint household expenses or similar purposes, or any property 
acquired out of such money, belongs to each spouse in equal shares. The rule therefore changed the common 
law presumption that such sums are provided for the purposes of household administration rather than as a 
personal donation. The new rule has been extended to civil partners also: Civil Partnership Act 2004 s. 261(2) 
and Sch. 28, Pt. 2, para. 29. 
12 
April 8, 2011 
transferor 68 and, in order to effect the transfer of the real right of ownership, registered in 
the Land Register. As noted earlier, the donee is not required to accept the donation; 
however, the donee has the right of rejection, in which case the donation is treated as 
void.69 In the modern law, revocation of an inter vivos donation, even on grounds of 
ingratitude, is not permitted, unless power to revoke was retained by the donor. Donations 
made by mistake or for a purpose which fails are remediable in unjustified enrichment, 
using either the condictio indebiti or the condictio causa data causa non secuta.70  
 The relative ease with which donations may be effected in Scotland (without the need 
for any specific form or for notarisation) is noteworthy. If one explanation may be offered, it 
would appear to be that the unilateral and gratuitous transfer which is at the heart of a 
donation is consistent with the Scottish approval of both gratuitous contracts and unilateral 
promises. The history of how that approval developed, under the influence of the canon law, 
has been traced elsewhere.71 
 
(c) South Africa  
In South Africa, donation must be entered into out of ‘pure liberality’ or ‘disinterested 
benevolence’,72 any reciprocal benefit to the promissor negating its nature as a donation.73 
Donation must therefore in South African law be an entirely (and not merely 
predominantly) gratuitous act. Unlike in many other systems, donation is conceived of as 
including the transfer not just of real but also of personal rights, the latter being affected by 
means of a gratuitous cession (assignment).  
 In some descriptions of donation in South African Law, the characterisation of 
contract is reserved for any obligation to effect a donation (J1), but not the succeeding act of 
transfer (J2). Thus, Jansen JA said of donation that 
 
it must be remembered that a contract of donation and the performance thereof, viz 
the delivery of the article donated, are two separate juristic acts: the one directed at 
creating an obligation and the other at transferring possession (and dominium).74 
 
Such a view seems to suggest that only (J1) is a contract, (J2) being a juristic act of a non-
contractual nature by which ownership is transferred (the same view of J2 as is taken in 
Scots law). By contrast, some commentators have described South African law as adopting a 
contractual analysis of both (J1) and (J2): thus, in one popular work on contract law, 
donation is described as comprising a preliminary contract establishing the duty to donate 
(J1) as well as a second contract effecting delivery of the subject of donation (J2). The second 
contract is described in the same work as operating both as a bilateral agreement 
discharging the original contractual obligation, as well as a so-called ‘real agreement’ 
                                                 
68 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s.1(2)(a)(i). 
69 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, vol. 8, para. 611. 
70 There is an ongoing debate as to whether positive proof of error by the pursuer is still a requirement for a 
claim brought under the heading of the condictio indebiti. If it is, then such a requirement would favour a 
defender who claimed that the payment was a donation, something which sits uneasily with the apparent 
presumption against donation in Scots law.  
71 See, for instance, M Hogg, Promises and Contract Law: Comparative Perspectives (2001, Cambridge University 
Press), esp. ch. 3. 
72 Avis v. Verseput 1943 AD 331 at 345, 377; CIR v. Estate Hulett 1990 (2) SA 786 (A) at 797H-J; Welch v. 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 2005 (4) SA 173. 
73 A donation made as recompense for past services or benefits, though styled a ‘remunerative donation’ is not 
subject to the restrictive rule on donations: see Avis v. Verseput 1943 AD 331.  
74 Jansen JA in Mankowitz v. Loewenthal 1982 (3) SA 758 (A), at 765A. 
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effecting the transfer.75 This dual contractual analysis seems unnecessarily complicated, 
imposing upon a juridical act of a property law character a further contractual aspect which 
is unnecessary to its proper functioning. It is suggested that Jansen JA’s conception of J2 in 
non-contractual terms is the preferable view. As is the case in other systems, an immediate 
act of donation, one not preceded by any obligation to donate, may occur, and is perfectly 
valid, even in the absence of the form discussed below for contracts of donation. In 
donations by means of a cession of rights, the donation is complete simultaneously with the 
cession, there being no subsequent act of transfer.76 
 Given that a contract to donate imposes a duty only on the donor, it is (in South 
African terms) a so-called ‘unilateral contract’, though also (being a contract) a bilateral 
juridical act.77 Though it is sometimes stated that the donor under such a contract makes a 
‘gratuitous promise’ to the donee, any such idea of promise is clearly of a contractual 
promise, one requiring acceptance before it can bind. In this respect, one may note the 
comments of Van Zyl J in Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. Marx that 
the donor’s intention must be ‘expressed as a promise (offer) to donate, which promise 
(offer) must be accepted by the donee before a binding contract of donation comes into 
existence’.78 
 A contract of donation must be in the form of a written document signed by the 
donor and witnessed by two witnesses.79 This requirement of form for a unilateral contract 
of donation is not that dissimilar to the formal requirement for non-business unilateral 
promises in Scotland (though in Scotland only one witness is required). Though this could 
be argued to be a good example of how the form of contract law can be manipulated by a 
legal system to accommodate what is in essence a unilateral promissory undertaking,80 it 
cannot be overlooked than in South African law the donee is required to accept the 
donation, even if not strictly required to sign the donor’s deed of donation (though such 
signature often happens), before the contract of donation is complete, so that South African 
law is insistent upon the agreement of donee. 
 It used to be said in South Africa that contracts for the benefits of third parties were a 
type of donation, the promissor being viewed as making a donation of the stipulated benefit 
to the third party. This view was however disapproved of in Hees v. Southern Life 
Association Ltd.81 The case raised the question of how the nomination of a third party 
beneficiary under a life insurance contract ought to be characterised, the court holding that 
it was in the nature of a stipulatio alteri. The judgment further held that, even if it might be 
argued that the circumstances could be classed as an act of donation, given the 
characterisation of the act as a stipulatio alteri, it was the legal requirements for that type of 
transaction which should determine the conditions under which the benefit could be 
                                                 
75 See S. Van der Merwe et al, Contract Law: General Principles (Cape Town: Juta & Co, 2007, 3rd edn.) p. 6. 
Other treatments of donation simply describe donation in the round as a contract (singular): see for instance 
Wille’s Principles of South African Law (Cape Town: Juta & Co, 2007, 9th edn.). 
76 See Botha J in Weiner NO v. The Master and Others NNO (1) 1976 (2) SA 830 (T), 842B-D. 
77 See Van der Merwe et al, ibid, p. 9. It was suggested earlier that it is preferable to reserve the term unilateral 
to juridical acts which are constituted by the actions of one party alone, but the South African tradition differs 
from this suggestion. 
78 [2006] ZAWCHC 9, 2006 (4) SA 195 (C), per Van Zyl J, at para. 24 of his judgment. 
79 See General Law Amendment Act No 70 of 1968, s.43; General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956, s.5. 
80 I have argued elsewhere that it would benefit legal coherence to recognise unilateral promises for what they 
are, rather than force them to wear contract’s borrowed clothing: see M. Hogg, ‘Promise: The neglected 
obligation in European Private Law’ (2010) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 461-79. 
81 2000 (1) SA 943 (W), 952-4. 
14 
April 8, 2011 
claimed and not the rules on donation. The judgment thus effectively results in the position 
that a stipulatio alteri is not to be seen as a type of donation in South African law.  
 
(2) French law 
 
In the Code civil, an inter vivos gift is said to be ‘a transaction by which the donor divests 
himself now and irrevocably of the thing donated, in favour of the donee who accepts it.’82 
The French Civil Code does not expressly state that donations must be gratuitous, but 
donation is treated as one type of gratuitous legal act (acte à titre gratuit), gratuitousness 
being generally understood by French jurists to mean that which is given without some 
equivalent or corresponding transfer being received in return.83 Thus, as Champeux puts it, 
to ‘make a gratuitous disposition means transferring property to another without receiving 
anything in its place’.84  As this statement, as well as the section of the Civil Code quoted 
above, makes clear, the focus in donation in French law is on the act of transference of the 
property in question: it is this which is conceived of as the donation. The donor must intend 
to make the donation,85 and the donee must accept it, before the donation has any legal 
effect.86 
 Inter vivos donation in French Law is a contract: on this point both the ancien régime 
and nineteenth century French writers agreed.87  Such a contract of donation might, in 
theory, be preceded by a prior promise to effect the donation at a subsequent point in time, 
but such a promise would again require acceptance to be a valid obligation and would have 
to be in the same notarial form as required for the donation itself.88 In French law, 
therefore, although the contract of donation is ‘unilateral’ in the French codal sense of being 
gratuitous, it does not make sense to speak of a ‘unilateral act’ or ‘unilateral promise’ of 
donation even though one can by contract bind oneself to make a donation in the future.  
 French law shares the suspicions of classical Roman law about donations, and 
maintains what, to outside eyes, look like absurdly restrictive rules on the constitution of 
inter vivos gifts or promises of inter vivos gifts.  Article 931 of the Code civil provides that 
 
All acts containing an inter vivos gift shall be executed before notaires in the 
ordinary form of contracts; and there shall remain the original of them, on pain 
of annulment.89 
 
Such notarial execution involves the appearance of donor and donee, usually before two 
notaries. The instrument of donation is read aloud, before the parties and notaries sign it. 
                                                 
82 Code civil Art. 894. 
83 5 Planiol et Ripert, Traité pratique de Droit Civil Français, no. 9. 
84 J. Champeux, Etude sur la notion juridique de l’acte à titre gartuit en droit civil français (Mâcon: Buguet-
Comptour, 1931). 
85 The courts have insisted upon the presence of donative intent: see Civ. 1 June 1977, Bull. civ. I no. 259; mere 
gratuitousness (i.e. lack of equivalence in French jurisprudence) is not enough: Civ. 14 Feb. 1989, Bull. civ. I no. 
79. 
86 Code civil Art. 932. 
87 See, for instance, both Domat and Pothier to this effect: Jean Domat, Les Lois Civiles dans leur Ordre Natural, 
1.1.10.1.1, in J. Remy (ed), Ouevres de Domat, vol. 1, p. 310 (1835) (‘The donation entre vifs is a contract that is 
made by reciprocal consent between the donor … and the donee …’);   Robert Pothier, Traité des Donations 
Entre-vifs, Prelim. Art., in Antoine-Philippe Merlin (ed), Oeuvres de Pothier, vol. 5, (1831) (‘The donation entre 
vifs is a convention…’). 
88 Unless the promise could be treated as a promise to fulfil a natural obligation, rather than one to make a 
donation: as to this, see further below. 
89 The somewhat stilted English is in the official translation promulgated by the French Government. 
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The instrument is then also copied in to the public record. The strict requirement of Article 
931 is backed up by Article 1339, which provides that no defects in inter vivos gifts can be 
cured after the event: a defective gift remains void, and has to be undertaken again in the 
correct form. The contrast with other systems, where often no formal involvement of the 
donee is required, and/or where delivery may cure defects, is marked.  
 The restrictive rule of Article 931 is widely avoided in one of two ways. First, moveable 
property can be validly gifted simply through a manual transfer of the subject of the 
donation. This position prevails as a result of court decisions, even though it flies in the face 
of the all-encompassing wording of the Article.90 Incorporeal moveable property is included 
in the exception, and in such a case relevant documentation represents the thing to be 
transferred (for instance, share certificates).91 More troublingly for the intended scope of 
Article 931, sham or disguised gifts have also been exempted from its provisions. This 
exception stems from a decision of the Cour de Cassation of 1800, holding that a gift 
disguised in a false document dressing it up as a sale was valid, though not in compliance 
with the rule on the form of inter vivos gifts.92 The decision was, after some debate,  
decisively upheld in 1824.93   
 The use of such sham transactions has become so widespread that the genuinely 
notarised gift is a rarity.94 The maintenance of this line of jurisprudence by the French 
courts (and the tolerance of such by the legislature) seems remarkable: if the terms of 
Article 931 are considered too harsh, then it would seem sensible to review them 
legislatively. Continued encouragement of the recitation of false statements in legal 
documents hardly seems conducive to the fostering of honesty and transparency in the legal 
system.  
 Another tendency which has marginalised the application of Article 931 is that a 
genuine contract of donation is classified as a contract of benevolence, that is to say it is one 
by which one of the parties procures a purely gratuitous advantage to the other.95 The 
jurisprudence of the French courts has developed a test of whether or not a contract is 
genuinely benevolent based upon the intention of the parties. In other words, as in Roman 
law, what matters is whether or not there is animus donandi.96 They have held that a 
contract undertaken from mixed motives, that is, only for partly benevolent reasons, does 
not count as donation: if the donor intends even some advantage to be gained by making 
the transfer, it is not a gift. The Cour de Cassation has previously held in one case that the 
obtaining of personal pleasure and satisfaction from promising funds constituted mixed 
motives, and so prevented the promise from being one of donation.97 However, more recent 
case law has sought evidence of a genuine economic benefit to the party making the transfer 
before it can be held not to be donative.98 That seems a logical conslusion, as there can be 
                                                 
90 See Dawson, Gifts and Promises, p. 71. 
91 See cases mentioned by Dawson, ibid, p. 73.  
92 The decision is reported in P. Sirey, Recueil général des lois et des arrêts, avec notes et commentaires, 
1802.3.1.20. 
93 A similar approach has been adopted in Belgium: see authorities cited by Dawson, Gifts and Promises, p. 77, 
fn 25. 
94 See Dawson, ibid., p. 82.  
95 Art. 1105.  
96 See Dawson, Gifts and Promises, p. 84 f.  
97 D.P. 1863.1.402 (1863).  
98 See for instance Trib. gr. inst. Nanterre 4 July 2000, Rép. not. Defrén. 2002 art. 37454 at 3, which decided that 
a number of small gifts to a religious organisation were not deprived of the character of donations merely 
because the donors might have derived some moral satisfaction from making them. See also J Gordley, The 
enforceability of promises in European Contract Law (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 27.  
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few cases of donation where the donor will not obtain some pleasure from undertaking the 
donative act.  
 Another way in which the provisions of Article 931 are avoided in some cases is that a 
unilateral promise to perform a natural obligation is not treated as a donation, but rather as 
effecting a transformation of the natural obligation into a valid civil one. Thus, for instance, 
where A promises to pay for harm which he has caused to B, but which is not the subject of 
a legal duty to pay damages but only a natural duty to do so, he would by so promising be 
treated (according to the French jurisprudence) as having transformed the natural 
obligation to pay damages into a civil one, and thus one actionable by B. So, what might 
appear to be the promise of a gift by A is in fact treated as an act which transforms a natural 
right possessed by B into a civil one. The same analysis would be used of a promise to pay a 
debt which was no longer legally due (because it had prescribed, or been discharged in 
bankruptcy, for instance). The Cour de Cassation thus held a promise by a lottery winner to 
share his winnings with a friend who had completed the lottery entry form as transforming a 
natural duty to share the winnings in to a civil one to do so.99    
 Though an oral gift of land is, like all other oral gifts, void under Article 931, there is 
case authority to the effect that if the donor has allowed the donee to live on the land and 
has voluntarily created false hopes of ownership on the part of the donee, the donee will be 
liable in damages in delict under Article 1382.100  Such a remedy is evidently a far cry from 
enforcement of the oral act of donation, such occurring, for instance, in Scotland (albeit that 
in Scotland a signed disposition of the property would in any event have to be delivered by 
the transferor as a pre-requisite for transferring ownership). 
 
(3) German law 
 
In modern German law, donation is dealt with mostly under the extensive provisions of 
§§516-534 of the German Civil Code (BGB), as well as by reference to a few other 
provisions.101 Donation is defined under the BGB as a disposition, agreed by the parties to be 
gratuitous,102 by which A enriches B out of A’s assets.103 As this distinctive approach to the 
idea of the gratuitous nature of donation focuses on the agreement of the parties, any 
further requirement relating to the motive or animus donandi of the giver, as exists (for 
instance) in French law, is superfluous.  The reference to A’s assets precludes services from 
being the subject of donation, and the notion of a disposition excludes cases where A is not 
permanently deprived of his assets (gratuitous contracts of mandate, loans for use, and 
deposit, are dealt with elsewhere in the Code).104 There must be a demonstrable loss to the 
donor and a demonstrable gain to the donee, though the gain to the donee may flow only 
                                                 
99 D 1997, Chr 85, note Molfessis.  
100 See Aix 11 Jan 1983, DS 1985, 169 n, Légier.  
101 For instance, §1624 BGB, which regulates, inter alia, promises of donations made by parents to their children 
in contemplation of the children’s marriage. 
102 In German law, a gratuitous obligation is one which is not linked with another obligation, that is, it is not 
mutual in nature (see Hyland, Gifts, para. 283). Thus, if the party making the transfer believes that it is being 
made to extinguish an obligation, even a natural obligation, then it is not made gratuitously: RG 17 Jan 1902, 
RGZ 50, 134; H. Kolhosser in Münchener Kommentar, BGB, § 516 no 16. In a case where a promise was made by 
a man to a woman to pay her a sum of money should he marry, the RGH held that the circumstances indicated 
that the parties had not agreed that the promise was gratuitous, but rather had understood that it was a 
commitment made to compensate the woman for the many sacrifices she had made for him and the many 
contributions she had made to his life: see RG 23 Feb 1920, RGZ 98, 176.  
103 As defined in §516(1). Both property and contract rights are included, as are the release of a debt and a 
waiver of rights. Payment of the donee’s debt to a third party may also be an act of donation. 
104 For mandate, see §662 f, for loans for use see §598, and for gratuitous deposits see §690. 
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indirectly from the donor, as occurs for instance if the donor discharges a debt owed by the 
donee to a third party.105    
 As in other systems, donation may occur without any prior obligation requiring the 
donation (as, for instance, in the case of the unexpected or impromptu gift) or it may be 
preceded by a contract of donation. It has been suggested106 that, to distinguish these two 
situations, the former may usefully be called a ‘manual gift’ (Handschenkung) and the latter 
a ‘promissory gift’ (Versprechensschenkung), though these precise terms are not used in the 
BGB, which instead talks of a disposition (the act of transfer) and a promise or contract of 
donation.107 
 The act of transfer itself - the disposition (Die Zuwendung) - either occurs by actual 
concurrence of the will of the parties, or it may occur without reference to the will of the 
donee (‘ohne den Willen des anderen’, as §516(2) puts it) so long as the donor makes the 
disposition together with a request that it be accepted within a specified reasonable period 
of time, and the donation is not rejected within that time (this has the effect that the 
donation is deemed to be accepted by the donee, thus confirming the donative disposition). 
In essence then, acceptance of the donation (whether actual or implied) by the donee is 
always necessary, even if in the case of presumed acceptance it is highly fictional. One may 
question the positive requirement that the transfer be accepted: if the concern is that 
donees do not become the unwilling or unwitting owners of assets which are forced on 
them, then it would seem perfectly possible (as is the case in Scotland) simply to give the 
donee a right to reject the asset, rather than positively require him to accept it, such 
rejection having the effect of ex tunc nullity of the transfer. 
 Contracts of donation require notarial recording of ‘the promise’ (as the relevant 
section styles the commitment to donate) in order to be valid,108 though failure to meet this 
requirement can be cured by rendering performance under the donation.109 This reference 
to ‘promise’ is telling: as the provision is designed to provide protection for the donor, it 
means that technically it is only its declaration of donative intent which requires to be 
notarised, even if in practice, if both parties have signed a contract of donation in any event, 
the declaration of both is likely to receive notarial recording.110   An exception to the notarial 
requirement is the donation in favour of a third party by virtue of a third party contractual 
right, for instance the beneficiary under a life insurance policy, 111 which brings German law 
some (though not all) of the way towards the South African position of exempting  
gratuitous third party rights from classification as donations. 
 But what is the status in German law of a mere unilateral promise, rather than a 
contract, to make a donation? For example, what is the position if A states to B ‘I promise to 
give you €1,000 on the 1st of next month’, and nothing else (specifically, no acceptance of the 
promise) happens for the present? In such a case, there would appear as yet to be no 
contract of donation, and thus no concluded obligation on the part of the donor. However, 
it could be that such a promise might be treated as an offer, which in German law would by 
default  remain open for acceptance by the offeree (the intended donee) for a reasonable 
                                                 
105 The similarity of the elements required for a claim in unjustified enrichment - though evidently with the 
distinction that the animus donandi provides the justification for retention of the enrichment - is noticeable. 
106 H. Kollhosser in Münchner Kommentar, BGB, §518, no 2. 
107 §518 is entitled ‘Form des Schenkungsversprechens’ (Form of the promise of donation), but the terms of the 
section speak of a ‘contract’ rather than a promise. 
108 §518(1). 
109 §518(2). 
110 If, however, notarisation of both parties’ declarations was required by another provisions, as for instance 
with land contracts, then that requirement would have to be met.  
111 H Kollhosser in Münchener Kommentar, BGB, § 518 nos. 6–7. 
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time (such time, one would assume, would have to have expired prior to the time specified 
for payment). When an acceptance to this offer was forthcoming, a contract of donation 
would come in to being, though as a donative promise to pay it would require to be in 
writing and to be notarised.112 To non-German eyes, this contractual explanation seems a 
somewhat roundabout and thus not entirely satisfactory way of holding a donor to his 
clearly expressed unilateral declaration of will. A more direct means of enforcing the 
unilateral undertaking would surely reflect the reality of what is going on and show greater 
respect for the will of the intending donor.  
 Unlike in modern Scots and English law, in German law ingratitude on the part of the 
donee can found a right on the donor’s part to revoke the donation, so long as ‘the donee is 
guilty of gross ingratitude by doing serious wrong to the donor or a close relative of the 
donor’,113 such provision being a remnant of Roman law. But, other than this exceptional 
provision, references to liberality or magnanimity on the donor’s part in the definition of 
donation itself were stripped from German law during the course of the nineteenth century 
and did not make it in to the BGB.114 What is important for defining donation in present day 
German law is the gratuitous nature of the transaction, not its preceding cause. 
 Donations may be made conditionally,115 and if the condition is not fulfilled the donor 
is entitled to demand the return of the gift.116 Such conditions often relate to the way in 
which, or the purposes for which, the assets donated may be used. However, where the 
condition might conceivably be of benefit to the donor, the difficulty arises of how to 
distinguish between a permissible conditional donation and a contract of exchange (which 
clearly cannot be a donation in German law, by virtue of not being strictly gratuitous). If any 
benefit which accrues to the donor as a result of the condition might alternatively be 
characterised as a diminution in the value of what has been transferred, the German courts 
have been willing to treat the case as one of conditional donation. Thus, for instance, a 
condition in a donation of land that the donor be allowed to remain on the land for the rest 
of his life was held to be a subtraction from the value of the gift, and did not make the 
relationship one of exchange.117 It will be evident that such a nice distinction (avoided in 
many cases in Louisiana by the requirement that donation be only ‘predominantly 
gratuitous’) is difficult to apply in practice.  
 A related issue with which the German courts have had to struggle is how to 
characterise a promise which, without being conditional, appears to have a mixed nature, 
partly donative and partly remunerative (the ‘remunerative donation’ of Louisiana law). For 
instance, if A promises B the sum of €1,000, in part to repay a loan of €500 but also in order 
to gift the remaining €500, what is the nature of the promise made: is it a gift by A, or is it 
undertaken to remunerate B for a benefit already received by A? If it is a promise of a gift, 
then of course it requires proper notarisation to be valid. The courts have held that the 
mixed natures of such a transaction ought to be examined separately.118 This however is not 
necessarily enough to save the remunerative portion of the promise from being invalid, 
because §139 BGB provides that, if part of a legal transaction is void, the entire transaction is 
void, unless it can be assumed that the transaction would still have been undertaken 
without the void part. In the case of the example given, such an assumption would not hold, 
                                                 
112 §§ 518(1), 780 BGB. 
113 §530(1). 
114 Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, p. 502; Dawson, Gifts and Promises, pp. 137-9.  
115 §525. 
116 §527. 
117 NJW 1949, 788.  
118 148 RGZ 236.  
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as A would not have undertaken to pay €1,000 merely to discharge a debt of €500. So, while 
in German law a promise may be seen as having a mixed character, partly donative and 
partly of exchange, the consequences of the invalidity of one of those natures is taken to 
affect the whole transaction.  
 
(4) The Common law 
 
The Common law, like Roman law before it and indeed other modern legal systems, is 
suspicious of donation, or ‘gift’ as the gratuitous transfer of property is usually called in 
English law. As Harman LJ put it, ‘[t]he English law of the transfer of property, dominated as 
it has always been by the doctrine of consideration, has always been chary of the recognition 
of gifts.’119 
 In the Common law, in contrast with many of the other systems studied, gift is not 
characterised as a contract. This is unsurprising, given that contracts (except those 
undertaken in deed form) require to be supported by mutual consideration in order to be 
valid, while a gift is by definition a gratuitous act120 by which A transfers to B property in 
certain subjects. The concepts of consideration and gift thus seem to be irreconcilable 
opposites.  How, despite this conceptual problem, the Common law is able, in some cases, to 
enforce de facto promises to make gifts is discussed below. 
 In English law, a gift may be validly effected by an immediate transfer of the property 
which is the subject of the gift, either by the handing over of the property121 or some symbol 
of it (for instance, the title deeds to land122). There is no requirement for a written, 
subscribed document embodying an immediate donation,123 or for notarisation. Though a 
gift must be accepted, such acceptance is presumed unless and until dissent is demonstrated 
by the donee.124 Apart from such an immediate manual transfer of the subjects or a symbol 
of them, gift may also be undertaken by deed (discussed further below) or via trust.125  
 Given both the need for mutual consideration for a valid contract and the conflicting 
feature that donation is by nature gratuitous, how might one contractually bind oneself to 
make a gift in the future? The answer to the conundrum is that undertakings to give 
something of value to another can be supported by esoteric consideration, so that what is in 
effect a gift, made for nominal consideration, can be put into enforceable contractual form. 
Such esoteric but perfectly valid consideration allows enforcement of the contract (albeit 
that the contract is not technically a donation, given that the relationship is not gratuitous), 
so long as the consideration is rendered on condition of the promise. This solution means 
that certain transactions which in civilian systems would be treated as cases of donation can 
be enforced in the Common law as bargains on account of deemed adequate consideration.
 This approach is made easier in England by the English courts’ attitude that the 
                                                 
119 In Re Cole [1964] Ch 175, at 185; [1963] 3 All ER 433, 435. 
120 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, II,xxx,1 (§ 440). For US law, see Restatement (Third) of 
Property (Wills and Other Donative Transfers) § 6.1 (comments d and e), which states that gratuitousness 
requires not only that the transfer take place without consideration, but also that it not be done in satisfaction 
of a legal obligation. 
121 Cochrane v Moore [1890] 25 QBD 57 (CA).  
122 Law of Property Act 1925, s.52(1). 
123 Although the requirement for a deed is imposed in relation to transfers of ownership in land, whether for 
value or not: Law of Property Act 1925, s.52. 
124 ‘It was settled as long ago as the time of Lord Coke that the acceptance of a gift by a donee is to be presumed 
until his dissent is signified, even though the donee is not aware of the gift’ Per Lindley LJ, London and County 
Banking Co Ltd v. London and River Plate Bank (1888) 21 QBD 535, 541. 
125 See further Halsbury’s Laws, vol. 20(1), para. 2. 
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adequacy of consideration will not be looked in to; while the US courts have also adopted 
this view as a general rule,126 they are willing to open up an investigation into the adequacy 
of consideration in cases of gross disparity between what is offered by each party.127 In 
England, the courts have, for instance,  held that a promise to pay someone a sum of money 
may find good consideration simply by the promisee’s undertaking to come and collect the 
money.128 Likewise, A’s promise to make B a gift of £10,000 if B marries is a valid promise if 
supported by B’s reciprocal promise to marry, the promise of B being deemed adequate 
consideration for A’s promise. There is precedent for finding such a counter promise to 
marry even where the facts seem on their face to disclose no more than a gift made in 
prospect of the donee’s marriage.129 Things are, on the face of it, a little trickier in US 
Common Law, where, despite the general rejection of an inadequate consideration rule, 
nominal consideration is often held not to be valid out of a concern that such consideration 
can be used as an attempt to clothe what would otherwise be unenforceable unilateral 
promises as sham bargains.130 Such an attitude has the potential to be problematic for 
attempts to clothe some gifts as bargains. Nonetheless, the American courts have shown 
willingness to recognise non-pecuniary consideration as valid (for instance, love and 
affection or a pledge of marriage), a view which allows recognition of the validity of affective 
gifts. Additionally, where a promise of donation may also be characterised as having been 
made, in part, for some counter consideration, the American courts have treated the whole 
promise as being supported by consideration and thus as not requiring the stricter form 
required for gifts.131 This may be contrasted with the approach of the German courts, 
discussed earlier, which have held that the mixed natures of a promise should be separated 
out by a court. Lastly, of course, the development in the US of the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel has permitted the enforcement of promises of gift where the intended beneficiary 
has relied upon the promise, even if it was not supported by valid consideration or made in 
conformity with necessary formalities.132 
 Because English law also recognises that conditional promises may be the foundation 
of a bargain, some transactions which might have been classed as invalid gifts have instead 
been classed as conditional promises accepted by the promisee, often by conduct, and thus 
valid contracts. Thus, for instance, a promise to transfer a house to promisees if and when 
they paid all the mortgage payments on it was considered not as an invalid gift but as a 
unilateral contract accepted by the conduct of the promisees in making the mortgage 
instalment payments.133  
 The treatment of the English and American courts of some transactions as contracts 
which would elsewhere be classed as gifts represents an imaginative approach to the 
difficulty which the doctrine of consideration poses to the validity of promises to donate. A 
less fictional and strained treatment would, of course, be achieved by a general recognition 
of gratuitous transactions: gifts will undeniably find a more comfortable niche in the 
                                                 
126 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §79, comment c. 
127 See Parker v. Dodge, 98 S.W.3d 297, at 301–302 (Tex. App. 2003). 
128 This position was settled early on, in Gilbert v. Ruddeard (1608) 3 Dy 272b, 73 ER 606. 
129 Shadwell v. Shadwell [1860] 9 CB 159.  
130 The problem is discussed by all commentators: see, for instance, Farnsworth, Contracts (4th ed.), §2.11. §71 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is generally considered to have hardened the attitude against such 
sham bargains (see Illustration 5 to the article; see also commentary to that effect in E. Polubinski, ‘The 
Peppercorn Theory and the Restatement of Contracts’, (1968) 10 Will & Mary LR 201-11). 
131 See for instance Hamer v. Sidaway 124 NY 538, 27 NE 256 (1891); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 
comment c. 
132 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §90. 
133 Errington v. Errington [1952] 1 KB 290 (CA). 
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Common law if and when the doctrine of consideration is abolished. Until such time, 
genuine promises of donation will be able to be made validly in England only by way of 
deed, that is, in writing expressing the intention that it be treated as a deed, signed by the 
donor, witnessed, and delivered to the donee,134 or through the creation of a trust; in the US, 
where trust is also a possible means to confer a gift, some states still maintain the formality 
of the seal, though some have abolished it, with the result that, where the seal has been 
abolished, either the gift must be put into the form of a so-called ‘deed of gift’ (a signed and 
witnessed instrument of gift) or else consideration or delivery is necessary to validate the 
promise of the gift.  
 
(5) Proposals for harmonisation of European law 
 
At the present time, a great deal of scholarly analysis is being undertaken of the basis for a 
possible harmonised European private law set out in the Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR).135 The provisions of the DCFR relating to donation (Part H of Book IV) merit 
consideration. Do they represent a desirable harmonised approach for European (and 
perhaps wider) law? 
 The opening sentence of the first Article of the DCFR provisions concerning donation 
explains the intended primary field of application of the donation provisions: ‘This Part of 
Book IV applies to contracts for … donation ...’.136 Importantly, however, a later Article adds 
that the provisions are to apply with appropriate adaptations to cases where a donor 
unilaterally undertakes to donate, as well as to immediate donative transfers.137 The 
framework of the DCFR provisions thus encompasses both unilateral promises and contracts 
to donate (J1) as well as acts of transfer by which donation is effected (J2), whether or not the 
latter are preceded by any obligation to donate. Given the divergent jurisdictional 
treatments of donation, this approach to the concept of donation seems a commendably 
inclusive one to have adopted.  
 Donation is defined as a gratuitous transfer of ownership by the donor to the donee, 
with the intention of benefiting the donee.138 Unlike the approach of, for instance, German 
law, this definition includes not only the element of an objective transfer of value but also a 
requirement of animus donandi.139 Transactions can have a mixed donative/remunerative 
character and still constitute a donation, and, unlike Louisiana law, no precise proportions 
are stated for the donative/non-donative ratio: transactions will be treated as donative so 
long as there is an intention inter alia to benefit the donee and the values conferred by each 
                                                 
134 Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, s.1. Under the Law of Property Act 1925 a legal estate in 
land may only  be transferred by way of deed: this includes donations of land (s.52(1)). 
135 C. von Bar and E. Clive (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Contract Law: Draft 
Common Frame of Reference, 6 vols. (Oxford University Press: 2010). 
136 Art. IV.H.-1:101(1). This Article further makes it clear that the primary province of the DCFR donation 
provisions is conceived of as being the donation of goods, but Art. IV.H.-1:103 provides that other matters 
(money, electricity, incorporeal property, and rights in information or data) are also included. Immovable 
property or rights in such property are, however, excluded (Art. IV.H.-1:103(2)), which evidently creates a large 
gap in the DCFR coverage of donation. On the other hand, donations of rights to claim performance of an 
obligation (for instance, a service) are included in the regime (Art. IV.H-1:103(d)), which makes it broader in 
one respect than some national donation regimes.  
137 Art. IV.H.-1:104. 
138 Art. IV.H.-1:102. The undertaking to transfer is gratuitous if ‘done without reward’ (Art. IV.H.-1:201), which 
focuses on the factual question of a reciprocal benefit rather than the ability to compel any such benefit. 
139 Intention to benefit is not given an exhaustive definition, the DCFR merely explaining that such intention 
may be present even if the donor is under a moral obligation to effect the transfer or has a promotional 
purpose in effecting it: Art. IV.H.-1:203. 
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party are regarded by them as not substantially equivalent.140 An undertaking subscribed by 
the donor (either in hard copy or electronic form) is required to effect donation,141 except in 
the case of immediate transfers, donations by a business, or in defined circumstances where 
the undertaking is contained in a public broadcast.142 It is noteworthy that the donee’s 
signature is not a required part of the form, which suggests that any acceptance of a contract 
of donation might be by other means and might, perhaps, even be implied in the 
circumstances (though the text of the articles does not make this clear). Clearly, if it is a 
unilateral promise to donate which is at issue, no acceptance (whether express or implied) is 
necessary.  
 Donation is presumed to be irrevocable,143 unless a power to revoke is conferred 
under the contract (or unilateral promise to donate)144 or in the provisions of the DCFR (one 
such specified case is, as in German law, on account of the donee’s gross ingratitude).145 As 
in many of the systems studied, the transfer (J2) must be accepted (and delivery taken) by 
the donee.146 This requirement is an additional requirement to any acceptance which must 
be made of an offer to donate under a contract of donation (J1).  
 The DCFR model is commendable in the clear distinction it makes between the 
juridical act which is an obligation to effect a donation (J1) and the juridical act by which the 
gratuitous transfer of ownership is effected (J2). It sensibly avoids characterising the act of 
transfer as itself contractual or promissory in nature, saving such characterisations for 
possible ways by which an obligation to donate may be constituted. Its mixed 
characterisation of the nature of donation by reference to both the objective effect of the 
transaction and the animus donandi is reminiscent of the approach of Louisiana law. Its 
willingness to allow the unilateral promise to play a role in donation - as one means by 
which to undertake an obligation to donate - is reminiscent of Scots law, and demonstrates 
a realisation of the flexible and beneficial uses to which the unilateral promise might be put 
in a future harmonised private law. Unfortunately, such a realisation appears not yet to have 
penetrated into existing EU legislation, where it would seem that a contractual conception 
of donation remains the single model, with the result that non-contractual manifestations of 
donation appear not to be caught by some legislation.147 
 
(6) Conclusions 
 
As the foregoing discussion discloses, the treatment of donation in the various legal systems 
studied varies dramatically, albeit that there are some features common to a number of legal 
systems. There is spectrum of ease by which donation may be undertaken, from Scotland at 
one extreme where, despite a presumption against donation, contracts or unilateral 
promises to donate may quite readily be undertaken, and where only animus donandi  is 
                                                 
140 Art. IV.H.-1:202. 
141 Art. IV.H.-2:101. 
142 Art. Iv.H.-2:102. 
143 Art. IV.H.-4:101. 
144 This would seem to be one of the ‘appropriate modifications’ of the provisions of the Articles envisaged by 
Art. IV.H.-1:104. 
145 On revocation for ingratitude, see Art. IV.H.-4:201. 
146 Art. IV.H.-3:301. 
147 So, for example, Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 (implementing the Rome I Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Regulations) seems to apply to contractual forms of donation only, even though, for 
instance, Recital 9 of the Proposal for a Regulation (on instruments of succession) contained within COM 
(2009) 154 Final states expansively that Reg. 593/2008 covers the ‘validity and effects of gifts’. It would appear 
that the EU Commission has not fully appreciated that gifts can be in non-contractual form, and that such 
non-contractual gifs are therefore not covered by Reg. 593/2008. 
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necessary to effect transfer of the property, to England at the other extreme, where it is very 
hard to give obligations to donate valid legal form without resorting to esoteric conceptions 
of consideration, albeit that immediate donations can be effected manually without any 
formality. It is typical of civilian systems, and is also the position of Louisiana law, to insist 
upon formalities in respect of acts of donation (notarisation being a requirement in German, 
French and Louisiana law), as well as to adopt a contractual conception of undertakings to 
donate, and sometimes of the act of transfer also (though here, while an acceptance is 
usually looked for, this does not always denote a contractual acceptance). On such an 
approach, the role of promise is somewhat limited. Where donation is said to have a 
promissory aspect to it, this is predominantly in relation to the juridical act obliging a 
donation (J1) rather than the act of transfer by which ownership is conveyed (J2). Even then, 
promise is usually meant in a contractual sense: the intending donor offers (thus, 
conditionally promises) to effect the donation, an offer which the intending donee must 
accept. Scotland is the obvious exception, where it is quite possible unilaterally to promise 
to effect a donation, subject to a requirement of written form in the case of non-business 
promises. That seems a valuable possibility, one endorsed in the permissive approach of the 
DCFR, because, as stated towards the beginning of this paper, there is no reason why 
donation should not be seen as, at heart, a unilateral act, both as regards any duty to donate 
as well as regards the act of conveyance of the property. There is no over-riding need for the 
co-operation of the donee to effect a donation, albeit that it seems right that the donee be 
able to reject the donated property. The unilateral promise, as one type of unilateral 
juridical act, seems well suited to capture the nature of at least some undertakings to 
donate, even if not the act of transfer by which ownership is transferred, given the nature of 
such an act of transfer as a present conveyance of ownership rather than a pledge of future 
performance. To allow a role for unilateral promise in the law of donation is to permit 
certain instances of donation to take a form which most accurately mirrors their nature and 
the intentions of donors. That is surely a good thing, as it reflects the values of honesty and 
transparency in a legal system.  
 I have previously suggested148 that unilateral promise might play a much wider role 
not just in donation but in private law more generally, a field of law in which, in some 
systems, unilateral transactions are too often forced into the ill-fitting framework of bilateral 
contracts. However, it is only the impetus for harmonisation of national legal systems which 
is likely to result in such a desirable outcome, as well as the further desirable outcome of a 
common, cross-jurisdictional understanding of basic concepts such as gratuitousness and 
unilaterality. Until such outcomes are achieved, a comparable approach to donation in the 
several legal systems examined will remain a future hope rather than a present reality. 
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